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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a framework for establishing quantitative measures and mathematically reproducible
definitions of structural resiliency as it pertains to a structure's ability to minimize the potential for undesirable
response to low-probability-high-consequence events. The resiliency assessment and design process follow a
logical progression of steps starting with the characterization of hazards and continuing through analysis
simulations, damage modeling, and loss assessment by balancing functional relationships between design
tradeoffs and associated consequences. The outcomes of each subprocess are articulated through a series of
generalized variables: topology, geometry, damage, and hazard intensity measures. A rigorous probabilistic
framework permits consistent characterization of the inherent uncertainties throughout the process. The
proposed framework is well suited to support the building design process through stochastic characterization of
assessment measures. Using a stepwise approach, the framework facilitates a systemwide method to confront
multihazard threat scenarios by establishing functional relationships between the development of appropriate
models, design methods, damage acceptance criteria, and tools necessary for implementation. The proposed
methodology can be implemented directly for assessment of project-specific performance criteria or can be used
as a basis for establishing appropriate performance criteria and provisions to achieve resilient structural
solutions at the outset of design.
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent past has witnessed unprecedented levels
of structural failures in response to extreme loading
events and structural deterioration. Despite
engineers’ efforts to implement an elevated level of
design, these incidents have highlighted the
significant threat to our built environment posed by
low-probability-high-consequence events and the
shortcomings of conventional design approaches in
providing an effective engineering process to
confront failure propagation as part of the design
process. Emerging trends in the engineering
community suggest the problem is rooted in the
misnomer of achieving a “collapse proof” structure
using design approaches that address a limited
range of performance in response to specific
extreme loading conditions to incrementally increase
resistance. The resulting design, however, may be
unable to cope with even slight variability in the initial
design assumptions or structural response.
Given the need to preserve building functionality,
designers are turning to concepts of resiliency which
stress the need for a system to resist, adapt to, and
recover from exposure to a broad range of hazards.
The resiliency of a system is measured by its ability to
mitigate the effects of an extreme load and minimize

the recovery needed to restore functionality. The
concept of resilience is applicable at multiple levels
within the scale of the built environment, progressing
from structural components to single structures to
networks of structures to entire communities.
Evaluations of resilience at each level are critical to the
overall ability of our infrastructure to withstand and
recover from extreme events. The framework
developed in this paper will focus on the resilience of a
single structure to blast loads and potential local
damage. Frameworks at the structure level can then
be used to provide input for resilience models at the
network and community level.
This paper outlines a decision-based framework by
which the magnitude of the consequences to blastinduced local damage can be calculated and used to
assess structural resiliency. Current models define
system resiliency as the time to full (or nearly full)
recovery after a shock, insult, or disturbance (i.e.,
hazards). In this context, it is difficult to understand the
engineering process by which to evaluate and
implement resilience as part of the design process.
This paper proposes an alternate definition of
resilience in which the amount of required recovery is
correlated with the amount and severity of damage
inflicted by an air-blast threat. In this framework, the
user determines the likely damage for a range of
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increasing threats and decides whether the
corresponding consequences based on the sequence
of damage (which quantifies the resilience) is
acceptable.
Current
performance-based
methodologies are reviewed and adapted to provide a
procedural framework that is multideterministic and,
therefore, more accessible to engineers who rely on
the current state of practice. The mathematical
formulation of the proposed approach is discussed,
and a design example is provided in which the
proposed framework is demonstrated.
2. RESILIENCE VERSUS ROBUSTNESS
The key issue confronted by collapse-resistant design
approaches is the formulation of a building solution to
resist an unexpected and unpredictable event without
a priori knowledge of the location of the local damage
and, thus, the building’s load redistribution
requirements. At the epicenter of progressive collapse
theories and design practice is the concept of
robustness. This quality of a structural system
characterizes the extent to which stability can be
maintained when equilibrium is perturbed. Collapseresistant design is essentially the practice of
calculating structural robustness and enhancing the
ability of the building to cope with extreme load
conditions where it is necessary.
Lacking clear guidance in how to achieve robustness,
engineers have extended their understanding of
conventional structural theories in the pursuit of
collapse-resistant design. The predominant technical
methods employed in this exercise are deterministic in
nature and rely on a series of assumptions to reconcile
unknowns associated with damage scenarios, initial
conditions that define system resistance, and
observed variability in structural performance at the
brink of collapse and provide an achievable path to
implement collapse resistance. The design process is
largely characterized by a component-by-component
validation of the structure and subsequent local
strengthening of the system until a prescribed level of
robustness is achieved. This process is predicated on
the assumption that robustness is a variable property
of the structure, correlated to strength and load path
redundancy. However, observed structural behavior in
the aftermath of extreme loading events contradicts
this assumption. There are many examples where
seemingly highly redundant structures have failed and,
conversely, where expected building failure was not
observed.
This paper argues that the disparity between expected
and observed building performance is rooted in the
assumption that strength-based methods, applied at
the component level effectively, will adequately alter
the global resistance from which structural robustness
is derived. Rather than consider the resistance as a
sliding scale in relation to a fixed load, the proposed

alternative is to consider robustness as a fixed
property of the system that is uniquely tied to the
structural configuration as expressed in Equation 1:
Robustness = f(topology, geometry)

(1)

In this formulation of robustness, “topology” refers to
the building shell configuration relative to the site. This
property defines the expected exposure of the building
to widespread or local concentrations of extreme
loads. The "geometry" term refers to the layout of the
structural load-bearing elements. Both are absolute
properties that cannot be changed without
modifications to the overall building configuration. In
this way, once the building system's geometry has
been defined, so too has the structure's robustness.
If robustness is held to be an absolute property of the
system, then resilience represents the variable
property that fluctuates with specific design decisions.
Pursuit of resilience is typically considered to be an
exercise in balancing the ability of a given structure to
resist, adapt to, and recover from extreme events (see
Equation 2). The “resistance” component of Equation 2
represents engineering effort to withstand a prescribed
hazard. Load resistance allows the structure to
achieve rapid recovery to a wide range of threats by
avoiding damage. However, even robust structures
may experience some damage when subject to design
levels of extreme loads. To resist blast loads, building
elements are designed to experience allowable levels
of plastic deformation or cracking. Even if element
“failure” (i.e., collapse) is avoided, damaged elements
will require repair or replacement resulting in a
temporary loss of building functionality. Resistance
should therefore be provided, such that potential
damage minimizes casualties and reduces the
likelihood of catastrophic structural losses. The
“adaptation” component is largely understood to
consist of high-level emergency planning efforts to
restore facility function in the aftermath of a
catastrophe. The “recovery” component represents the
process over time in which facility function is restored
via repair and/or replacement. The perceived balance
of these variables as it impacts system resilience is
visually depicted in Figure 1 which plots functionality
on a time scale.
Equation 3 revises the common expression of
resilience to exclude the recovery and adaptation
components, as these parameters cannot be easily
quantified as part of engineering design efforts. The
resistance component of resilience is broken into
robustness and hazard parameters.
Resilience = f(resistance, adaptation, recovery)

(2)

Resilience = f(hazard, robustness) =
= f(hazard, topology, geometry)

(3)
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In this modified expression of resilience, the structural
performance associated with a specific system
configuration is considered to be independent from the
contribution of component strengthening to address a
prescribed load or hazard. The resulting equation for
resilience represents the specific hazard magnitude
mitigated by a structural design with an assigned
robustness. This definition of resilience allows
engineers to quantify resilience and robustness in
more certain terms and provides a basis to better
assess post-event structural behavior. By extension,
resilience, R, can be expressed mathematically as the
normalized integration of the functionality, Q, as shown
in Figure 1 (Bocchini & Frangopol, 2012), in which Q is
represented as a function of topology, T; geometry, G;
and hazard, H:
t

 1 r
  Q( H , T , G )dt
R = f(H, T, G) = 
t
t
−
 r 0 t 0

(4)

3. PROPOSED RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework is centered on a
performance-based calculation of the consequences
due
to
blast-induced
local
damage.
The
consequences, C, quantify the loss of functionality
which constitutes the initial condition needed for
integration in Equation 4. As a starting point, a riskbased integration based on the total probability
theorem is constructed, similar to that used by several
stochastic performance-based approaches (Barbato,
Petrini, Unnikrishnan &, 2013; FEMA, 2012), to
calculate the likely magnitude of the consequences
based on the topology, geometry, and hazards:

λ (c) =     G (C | DM ) ⋅ p( DM | ERP) ×
× p ( ERP | IM ) ⋅ p( IT | T ) ⋅ p(T ) ×
dDM ⋅ dERP ⋅ dIM ⋅ dT

(5)

Where G(…|…) is the conditional cumulative
distribution function; p(…|…) is the conditional
probability density function; T is the threat location
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of functional recovery following
an extreme event which causes damage

and size (accounting for the standoff and orientation
of the explosive threat to the structure as well as its
charge weight); IM is the intensity measure (i.e., the
magnitude of blast pressure and impulse due to the
threat); ERP is the engineering response parameter
(such as ductility, rotation, shear, or breach) due to
the IMs and Ts; DM is the direct damage caused by
the blast according to the ERPs; and C is the
consequence of the damage (i.e., the resulting
structural and/or functional losses). Equation 5 is
solved by sequentially solving for the probability of
exceedance for each successive parameter by
integrating its probability density function as
conditional of the upstream parameters. To achieve a
quantitative solution, a conditional probability density
function must, therefore, be developed, available, or
assumed for each step of integration.
To reduce the number of required probability density
functions, Equation 5 can be simplified by selectively
designating some of the parameters as deterministic
variables. The IM at every target on the structure can
be assumed to be a deterministic function of the
threat location and size, as is commonly done in
blast engineering practice (DoD, 2008). If threats are
examined one at a time, then the probability of DM
becomes directly correlated to the IM and the
integration over T is eliminated. Also, the integration
over ERP can be eliminated if deterministic,
predefined response limits are chosen (i.e.,
variability in the ERP is removed):

λ (c) =  G (C | DM ) ⋅ p ( DM | IM ) ⋅ dDM ⋅ dIM (6)

Equation 6 is used to evaluate the consequences for
each threat location which can then be compared
either graphically or numerically for all likely or
potential threat locations. Even though its integration
has been simplified, Equation 6 still requires that the
user provide probabilistic functions relating the
damage to the blast effects as well as the
consequences given the damage. To complete the
transition toward using deterministic rather than
probabilistic methods, we can replace the
probabilistic functions G(C|DM) and p(DM|IM) with
direct functions for C and DM. As is done in practice,
DM can be considered to be a deterministic function
of the exceedance of the ERP by the corresponding
IM. DM(IM) can be calculated using single degree of
freedom analysis of the elements (DoD, 2008)
according to response limits representing “failure”
(USACE, 2006). The function for C describes the
increase of consequences as a function of the
pattern of DM (i.e., as a function of DM given IM).
C(DM|IM) is a user-defined function that describes
the increasing amount of structural loss (and
therefore functional loss) associated with the location
and extent of damage. The calculated value for total
consequences can then be expressed as follows:
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C (T ) =  G ( DM | IM ) ⋅ DM ( IM ) ⋅ dDM ⋅ dIM (7)

The functions within the double integral in Equation 7
represent a surface that graphically describes the
overall consequences in response to increase threat
intensity for the given threat and geometry. The
volume under this surface is calculated via the
double integration and represents the initial condition
for the calculation of resilience, R. If the shape of
functionality Q in Figure 1 and Equation 4 is
assumed to include an instantaneous drop of
magnitude, λ(C), due to an extreme event at time, t0,
and is followed by a linear recovery to full
functionality at time, tr, then Equation 4 can be
rewritten as follows:

 1  r  C (T )
  
R(T) = 
 t r − t 0 t0  t r − t 0
t



t + t 0  dt



4.1. Site Layout—Topology
(8)

If the rate of recovery is assumed to be independent
of the magnitude or type of functionality loss, the
resilience can be more simply calculated as
inversely proportional to the consequences that
result from the intensity of the given threat:

R(T ) ≈

1
C (T )

Figure 2. Example 2-D, 5-story frame

(9)

The framework proposed in this paper establishes a
correlation between the pattern and sequence of
damage due to the spatial distribution of blast effects
on the building envelope to the resulting
consequences. In other words, the consequences in
terms of structural loss are governed by the order
and location of element failure as the intensity of the
blast threat increases. By developing the
consequences as a function of the damage due to
the distribution of threat intensity (i.e., C(DM|IM)), the
relative resilience of the building to damage caused
by a range of threat intensities (i.e., DM(IM)) can be
evaluated.
4. EXAMPLE
A simplified design example is provided to illustrate
the implementation of the proposed resilient
framework in the context of blast-resistant building
design. Two levels of structural robustness are
considered in which the frame is (1) not explicitly
designed to resist local damage (i.e., conventional
construction) and (2) designed to bridge over the
loss of a single one-story column (i.e., current
progressive collapse resistant design).
This example, ultimately, demonstrates the process
by which resilience can be assessed and high-level
design decisions can be made regarding structural
system configuration as part of early stages of the
design process where a fixed threat is considered.

The prototype structure used to illustrate the
proposed framework to calculate resilience is a twodimensional, 5-story frame, as shown in Figure 2.
The column grid is numbered consecutively from left
to right starting from Grid A to Grid J. Columns are
spaced at 9 meters; story height is fixed at 4.5
meters. As indicated previously, all columns are
assumed to be characterized by the same material
and section properties such that the same blast load
intensity will cause an exceedance of the selected
ERP of any one column. In practice, variable
element design would be accounted for in
determining the sequence in which failure
propagates from one column to the next given the IM
distribution.
4.2. Threat Locations and IM—Hazard
For this example, three explosive weapon threats
were considered. All threats are equal in magnitude
and plan-dimension offset from the frame. The
threats’ locations are as followed and were selected
to be consistent with current progressive collapse
practice of targeting critical ground level columns:
•

TL-1: Threat located at the end bay column
A-1.

•

TL-2: Threat located at the interior bay
column E-1, which is approximately
middimension of the frame.

•

TL-3: Threat is located at the center of the
interior bay bound by columns E-1 and F-1
and represents the threat considered to
result in potential simultaneous failure of two
first floor columns.

For the purpose of illustrating the procedure of the
proposed framework, we will first focus on TL-3.
Figure 3 depicts a scatter plot of air-blast pressures
and impulses (i.e., the blast intensity measure) for
each column (e.g., E-1 is column line E at story 1) for
TL-3. In Figure. 5, the points are ordered according
to descending intensity as a percentage of the
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maximum intensity to identify columns that are
exposed to the highest magnitude loads.
4.3. Consequence and Damage—Geometry
For Structure 2, the acceptable consequence would
be the loss of functionality only at the two bays
adjacent to the failure of a single one-story column
(i.e., preventing collapse of the floors bridging over
the failed column). The acceptable damage is
therefore the single column failure. For Structure 1,
the structure is not explicitly designed to withstand
any damage and, therefore, no allowable
consequences or damage has technically been
chosen. For the purpose of this example, Structure 1
is used as a comparison of relative resilience to local
damage to that of Structure 2.

4.4. The Sequence of Damage
Given the assumption that all columns are equal and
bound by a singular ERP, columns with the greatest
exposure to extreme loads are considered to also
experience the greatest extent of damage. In this
way, the example establishes a direct correlation
between the DM and IM components of the
mathematical formulation and simplifies the process
of assessing damage propagation. As shown in
Figure 4, for instance, column E-1 is expected to
experience the highest loads and incur the greatest
levels of damage. In practice, the IM field can be
used to assess damage on a component-bycomponent basis to establish a design-specific
correlation between the DM and IM parameters.
4.5. Damage and Consequence Functions
In general, the consequence function can be derived
by rigorous finite element analysis of the structure to
assess damage propagation given singular element
failure. However, for the purpose of the illustration of
the example, the consequence function is derived
empirically based on the number of frame bays
attributed to a specific column. In this way, failure of
an individual column can be deterministically
correlated to a structural loss measure. Each
consequence function is unique not only to structure
but also to threat location.

Figure 3. Hazard Intensity Measure (IM) scatter plot for each
column for TL-3

Figure 4. Topology plot of relative IM plot for all columns

Figure 5. Geometry plot of consequence function for Structure 1,
TL-3 (conventional design)

Figure 6. Geometry plot of consequence function for Structure 2,
TL-3 (progressive collapse design)

Using this method, the two structures of alternate
robustness—design with and without progressive
collapse resistance—can be compared in terms of
consequence. Figure 5 illustrates the consequence
function for the conventionally designed Structure 1,
which does not include progressive collapse
resistance. Failure of a typical interior column is
assigned a consequence of ten bays lost—the two
bays immediately adjacent to the column at ground
level and the eight bays above. The formulation of
the consequence function additionally considers the
equal relationship of all columns. Therefore, the
consequence of column E-5 failure encompasses a
two-dimensional spread of failed columns below on
Line E as well as adjacent columns that are
equidistant or closer to the threat location.
Figure 6 illustrates a similarly formulated
consequence function for Structure 2, which does
include collapse resistance at all column locations.
Since this structure is able to bridge the loss of any
single column, failure of one column is only expected
to result in functional loss at the two adjacent bays.
However, the propagation of damage that results
from the failure of two adjacent columns at the same
story (and beyond) produces the same consequence
as for Structure 1 since the progressive collapseresistant design is not sufficient to address any
larger extent of damage.
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4.6. Consequence and Resilience
An overall consequence measure (CM) can be
obtained by multiplying the consequence function (C)
of Figures 5 and 6 with the plot of relative IM portrayed
in Figure 4, which is directly correlated to the Damage
Measure (DM) for this example. Figures 7 and 8 show
the CM surfaces for Structure 1 and Structure 2,
respectively, for each considered threat location over
the domain of IM and DM. The consequence C(T) is
then obtained by calculating the volume under each
surface (i.e., by solving Equation 7).

Figure 7. Consequence measure and resilience indicator for
Structure 1

Additionally, Figures 7 and 8 indicate a Resilience
Indicator (RI) for each structure and threat, which is
a direct estimate of Equation 9. The consequence is
a summation of the total consequence associated
with the variable damage field across all elements.
Thus, a high RI can be achieved through a
combination of (1) consequence minimization for a
given threat or (2) threat reduction for an expected
consequence.

Figure 8. Consequence measure and resilience indicator for
Structure 2
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Examining the results, several key conclusions can
be made as follows:
•

Structure 1 is most resilient to TL-1 (RI =
8.54%) and least resilient to TL-2 (RI =
3.52%).

•

Structure 2 is similarly most resilient to TL-1
(RI = 19.3%) but is least resilient to TL-3 (RI
= 6.51%).

•

Structure 2 is generally considered to be
more resilient than Structure 1.

•

The calculated RI for Structure 2 in response
to TL-1 and TL-2 is roughly twice that of
Structure 1, providing a direct measurement
of the benefit for the design to resist the loss
of one element.

•

Structure 1 and Structure 2 have the same
RI for TL-3, which represents the threat
scenario expected to cause simultaneous
loss of two columns.

In general, the structure is only as resilient as the
weakest link, or, in the case of this example, the RI
associated with the limiting threat. Therefore,
Structure 1 and Structure 2 are considered to have
an RI of 3.52% (TL-2) and 6.51% (TL-3),
respectively. Based on this assessment, if it is
desired to elevate Structure 1 to the same level of
resilience as Structure 2 without implementation of
progressive collapse design, the design threat for
Structure 1 needs to be increased by a factor of 1.9
(6.51/3.52). This will elevate the hazard component
of the RI formulation to be more proportionate to the
consequence for this example.
Based on these results, the structural engineer is
able to make one of several decisions to dictate the
final design of the structure:
1. “No Action”—Proceed with conventional
design
of
the
frame
and
accept
consequence for the specified threats as
represented in the results for Structure 1.
2. “Collapse Resistance”—Implement collapse
resistance and accept the consequence for
the specified threats as reflected in the
results for Structure 2.
“"Selective
Strengthening”—Retain
the
configuration of the frame structure but
selectively strengthen columns to minimize
damage. This approach will not alter the
formulation of the consequence function,
which assumes failure, but results in an
adjusted Consequence Measure (CM) and
Resilience Indicator (RI).

3. “Reconfigure
Building”—Alter
the
configuration of the frame. This approach will
effectively change column orientation
relative to the threat and result in a different
Intensity Measure (IM) and Damage
Measure (DM).
4. “Reconfigure Site”—Alter the configuration of
the site. This action will require participation
of the architect, site planners, and owners to
change the site layout to mitigate the
explosive threats. This action would involve
the relocation of roadway, fences, locations
of potential screening, or obstructions that
may hinder surveillance of potential blast
threat locations.
Each of these decisions can be framed in the context
of overall impact to the building design, as well as
construction cost, to determine the most ideal
solution to optimize system resilience.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper outlines a decision-based framework by
which the magnitude of the consequences to blastinduced local damage can be calculated and used to
assess structural resiliency. The procedure for
resiliency
assessment
starts
with
the
characterization of hazards and calculates the
resulting damage modeling and functional loss by
deriving and subsequently balancing functional
relationships between design and consequences.
The outcomes of each process are articulated
through a series of generalized variables, termed as
topology, geometry, damage and hazard intensity
measures. The framework is multideterministic and
therefore more accessible to engineers who rely on
the current state of practice. A design example using
a 2-D structural frame was used to demonstrate the
implementation of the framework.
The proposed framework has potential to be adapted
for other hazard types such as impact or fire
exposure that, like blast, are typically characterized
by concentrated intensities. To address these
additional hazards, future work is needed to develop
methods to calculate the spatial distribution of
hazard intensity and characterize the resulting
damage and consequences. Adapting this procedure
for impact loads would be fairly straightforward since
most elements that are affected by the impact could
be evaluated on a pass-fail basis similar to the use
of performance criteria for blast load. Including fire
exposure poses a greater challenge since elements
with thermally induced material weakening and
restraint of thermal expansion will develop a broader
spectrum of damage across the structural system.
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Ideally, the framework would be extended to be
multihazard to capture the resilience of the structure
to the entirety of an extreme event (i.e., blast or
impact followed by fire at the location of damage). In
a previous study, the authors have examined the
consequences of fire that follows an initial extreme
event that results in local damage (Quiel &
Marjanishvili, 2012), and the incorporation of fire in
the framework would allow users to leverage studies
such as these to develop a holistic rather than
hazard-dependent
assessment
of
structural
resilience.
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